In my opinion, Landry made a mistake in conflicting with his clients. In the typical contingency fee situation, there is an uncertain outcome for the client, and it is generally accepted that the harder the lawyer works for the client, the better the chances of getting a successful monetary result. In Landry`s situation, the report shows that clients would be able from the outset to sell their shares in a non-contradictory environment, and the legal work required was largely ministerial. Landry may have seen a chance to win that is not wrong in itself, but he should have discussed it in detail with clients and given them a conditional or hourly choice. If he had and the clients would have opted for the contingency fee, I think they would have been maintained. 1. The following forms of conditional royalty agreements may be used to meet the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (e) if they accurately and comprehensively reflect the terms of the undertaking. [3D] A lawyer who does not intend to collect a fee if the representation is interrupted before the eventuality that allows the lawyer to collect a fee under the terms of a conditional agreement would not be obliged to use paragraph (6) of the conditional forms of the agreement under Rule 1.5 (f) (1) and (2). However, if a lawyer expects to assert a fee entitled when the representation is completed before the eventuality, the lawyer must inform the client of his intention to retain the opportunity to assert a right by incorporating into the contract of engagement the content of paragraph 6 of the type form of conditional pricing agreement, and it is expected that he can provide statements of the work done. sufficient to support such a claim.  Paragraph (f) contains models of contingency cost agreements and mentions the statements that a lawyer must provide to a client, unless the client is an organization, including a public or state agency.
In a recent 1:28 rule, Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the lawyer is responsible for proving adequacy when it comes to the appropriateness of an agreement on conditional costs. A simple practitioner, Landry, sued her clients, Elizabeth Haartz and her husband Walter Davis II, for breach of contract after he stopped paying Landry`s fees for his work in selling Haartz`s shares in their family`s company, Haartz Corp. The sale of shares made the pair $20,000,000.00. They filed a counter-action in which they explained that Landry, who had worked for 15 years on her estate planning and other different legal needs and whom she had trusted and thought as a friend, had charged them an overcharging in violation of the rules of professional conduct. Landry had presented Haartz and Davis with a contingency agreement in which he was to receive a tax of 1.5 per cent of the proceeds of the sale ($300,000.00). Apparently, Davis had wondered why Landry was not calculating an hourly rate as he had in the past, and Landry replied that “it was the way” to calculate the respective benefits. After the contract was entered into and the Landry couple then paid $121,000 of the $US 300,000 earned under the agreement, their accountant told them that such a sum of money for legal work on a share sale was not only unusual, but “out of line”. They immediately suspended the payments and, in July 2004, Landry filed a complaint against them for breach of contract. In October 2008, a jury found Landry in favour of the accused for breach of contract.